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1. Introduction  
Over the last decades, increasing discontent has been expressed with distributional analysis based on 
observations of income for a single year. The line of reasoning is that high annual inequality might 
occur side by side with little or no inequality in long-term incomes, if individuals’ positions in the 
annual income distributions change over time. This has led to a spur of research on inequality and 
social welfare in long-term or permanent income according to the Equality of Outcome (EO) 
principle.1 At the same time, a large and growing literature has addressed the problem of evaluating 
income distributions according to equality of opportunity (EOp); in all the existing contributions, 
however, snapshots of income still form the basis of analysis.2 The aim of this paper is to bridge these 
two strands of the literature by introducing and applying a general framework for evaluating long-term 
income distributions according to the EOp principle.3  
 
We follow the basic idea of the EOp literature closely in assuming that individuals' outcomes arise 
from two classes of variable: Variables for which they should not be held responsible for 
(circumstances) and variables which belong to the sphere of individuals' responsibility (effort). Once 
this basic partition has been made, the concept of EOp can be decomposed into two distinct ethical 
principles: The Compensation Principle, which states that differences in outcomes due to 
circumstances are ethically inacceptable and should be compensated; and the Reward Principle, which 
states that differences due to effort are to be considered ethically acceptable and do not justify any 
intervention. 
 
The existing literature on the measurement of opportunity inequality (see, among others, Bourguignon 
et al. 2003, Checchi and Peragine 2009, Dardanoni et al. 2006, Ferreira and Guignoux 2008, Lefranc 
et al. 2006a,b, Peragine 2002, 2004, Peragine and Serlenga 2008), has explored two main approaches 
to measure opportunity inequality, namely the ex-ante and the ex-post approach4. The two approaches 
give different definitions of EOp and embody the ethical principles illustrated above in different ways.  
 
                                                     
1 See e.g. Shorrocks (1978), Chakravarty et al. (1985), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), and Aaberge and Mogstad (2009).  
2 A notable exception is Bourguignon et al. (2007), which will be discussed in detail below.  
3 We refer to the conceptualization of EOp proposed by philosophers such as Dworkin (1981a,b), Arneson (1989), Cohen 
(1989) and on the economic literature - initiated by Roemer (1993, 1998) - that has explored different ways in which the 
concept of equality of opportunity may be translated in formal economic models (see Fleurbaey 2008 for a survey). 
4
 Notice that the ex ante and the ex post approaches can be incompatible (see Fleurbaey and Peragine 2009). 
 
4 
According to the ex-ante approach, there is equality of opportunity if the set of opportunities is the 
same for all individuals, regardless of their circumstances. Inequality of opportunity is reduced if 
inequality between individual opportunity sets decreases. This approach partitions the population into 
different types, where each type is formed by individuals endowed with the same set of circumstances. 
The type-specific outcome distribution is interpreted as the opportunity set of individuals with the 
same circumstances. Accordingly, it focuses on inequality between types, and is neutral with respect 
to inequality within types.5  
 
In comparison, the ex-post approach states that there is equality of opportunity if all those who exert 
the same effort have the same outcome. Inequality of opportunity decreases if outcome inequality 
decreases among the individuals at the same degree of effort. The ex post approach emphasizes 
inequalities within groups of individuals at the same effort levels, so-called tranches. Differences 
between tranches are interpreted as due to individual effort, and are considered as fair.6   
 
Our framework for evaluating long-term income distributions allows for both an ex-ante and an ex-
post approach to EOp. Our ex-post approach relies on a permanent income measure defined as the 
minimum annual expenditure an individual would need in order to be as well off as he could be by 
undertaking inter-period income transfers. There is long-term ex-post inequality of opportunity if 
individuals who exert the same effort have different permanent incomes. In comparison, the ex-ante 
approach focuses on the expected permanent income for individuals with identical circumstances. 
Hence, the ex-ante approach pays attention to inequalities in expected permanent income between 
different types of individuals.   
 
Our EOp framework requires aggregation in two steps. The first step consists of aggregating the 
income stream of each individual into an interpersonal comparable measure of permanent income. To 
this end, we draw on intertemporal choice theory and use a measure of permanent income which 
incorporates the costs of and constraints on making inter-period income transfers. The second step 
consists of aggregating individuals’ permanent incomes into EOp measures of social welfare and 
inequality. Specifically, we employ an axiomatic approach to justify the introduction of a generalized 
family of rank-dependent measures of ex post as well as ex ante opportunity inequality and social 
welfare. Our long-term perspective serves to highlight that inequality opportunities may accumulate 
                                                     
5
 This is the approach proposed, in different framework, by Van de Gaer (1993), Kranich (1996), Peragine (2004a). 
6 This is the approach proposed by Roemer (1993, 1998) and used by Roemer et al. (2003),  Peragine (2004b), Aaberge and 
Colombino (2009) and Checchi and Peragine (2009) 
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over time, if (dis)advantages beget (dis)advantages. Moreover, it allows for the possibility that groups 
viewed as (dis)advantaged based on snapshots of income may change positions over time. In such 
cases, policies that minimize snapshots of opportunity inequality may deviate from those optimizing 
equality of opportunity in long-term income. 
 
To demonstrate the empirical relevance of a long-run perspective on EOp, we exploit a unique panel 
data from Norway on individuals’ incomes over their working lifespan. This allows us to examine how 
well analyses of inequality and social welfare based on snapshots of income approximate the results 
based on long-term income. Further, we investigate how sensitive distributional comparisons between 
the EOp and the EO principle of justice are to the choice of accounting period of income. Finally, we 
assess to what extent the ex-ante and the ex-post approaches yield different pictures of opportunity 
inequality and social welfare.  
 
Our paper proceeds by clarifying the differences between our framework and the method for 
measuring long-term EOp proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007). Section 2 describes our method for 
aggregating the income streams of individuals into comparable measures of permanent income. 
Section 3 deals with the problem of aggregating permanent incomes across individuals into measures 
of long-term inequality and social welfare. Section 4 introduces a new family of rank-dependent EOp 
measures of inequality and social welfare. Section 5 reports the empirical results, before Section 6 
concludes.  
1.1. Long-term equality of opportunity: the order of aggregation 
To model long-term EOp we can think of two different approaches. The first, which is more in line 
with an ex ante perspective, is based on the following idea: First divide individuals into types who are 
homogeneous with respect to exogenous circumstances at a given point in time; the income 
distributions of a type i , at a given time t , call it ( )xFit , represents the opportunity set open to any 
individual belonging to type i at time t . Then aggregate the type evaluations across time periods, 
obtaining a long-term expression of the opportunity sets. Finally, evaluate the distribution of long-term 
opportunity sets. 
 
This is essentially the approach proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007): They first aggregate 
individuals in order to evaluate the opportunity set at a given time t. Successively they introduce some 
criteria to rank different distributions of time streams of opportunity sets in terms of equality of 
opportunity. This approach is in fact declined in two different variants. 
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In a first approach, Bourguignon et al. (2007, p. 243) define EOp as follow: There is EOp if, in each 
period, there is not dominance between types. Hence, in each period of time, there should be equality 
or, as a weaker definition, non-dominance of opportunity sets. This can be seen as the natural 
extension of the approach used by Lefranc et al (2006) and Peragine and Serlenga (2008) to a long-
term perspective. 
 
Alternatively, Bourguignon et al. (2007) propose a long-term extension of the utilitarian version of 
EOp, according to which there is EOp if the long-term expected value of all types are equal. Hence, 
they first introduce a type evaluation function, according to which each type distribution (i.e., 
opportunity set) at a given period t  is evaluated by the mean itμ (this is the utilitarian evaluation); 
successively, they introduce time aggregator in order to obtain an expression of  the long-term value 
of the opportunity set: For instance, ( )t itφ μ  where tφ  is a selected aggregator over time. Finally, they 
propose to maximize the minimum of the distribution of long.term type means. Hence, they use the 
following social welfare function:  
 ( ) min t iti
T
W F dtφ μ=    
This approach is coherent with an ex ante view of opportunity inequality and can be used if one is 
mainly interested in the inequality between types of individuals with the same circumstances. 
On the other hand, their methodology, given the order of aggregation, is unable to model in a 
satisfactory way the individual distribution of income over time. In fact, in their methodology the time 
aggregation is performed over opportunity sets, rather than on individual outcomes. 
 
As discussed in detail below, we take a different approach to long-term EOp. In our methodology, first 
the aggregation over time is performed for each individual. This allows us to be specific with respect 
to the underlying model of intertemporal choice. Successively, we obtain a distribution of long-term 
incomes: To such distribution we apply a partition into types and, hence, propose different models of 
equality of opportunity.  
 
Our approach, in addition to being more satisfactory with respect to modelling the individual  
valuation of long-term income, is more general in that it allows to adopt either an ex ante or an ex post 
approach to long-term EOp. In the ex ante (utilitarian) approach, we define EOp as equality in the 
expected permanent income for individuals with identical circumstances, which coincides with the 
approach of Bourguignon et al. (2007) if and only if the mean permanent income for each type can be 
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expressed as a weighted average of the period-specific mean incomes. In the ex post approach, we 
define EOp as equality of outcomes for individuals with the same effort, where both the outcome and 
the effort refer to a long-term perspective rather than to a snapshot. Moreover, both in the ex ante and 
in the ex post approach, our framework allows for any position when it regards attitude towards 
inequality aversion.  
2. Measurement of permanent income 
This section outlines the permanent income introduced by Aaberge and Mogstad (2009), which forms 
the basis for our EOp measures. This permanent income measure had the advantage of conforming to 
the basic structure of intertemporal choice theory and justifies comparison of permanent incomes 
across individuals. We will first consider the case of a perfect credit market, before allowing for credit 
market imperfections. 
2.1 Permanent income definition 
Aaberge and Mogstad (2009) defines permanent income as the minimum annual expenditure an 
individual would need in order to be as well off as he could be by undertaking inter-period income 
transfers. To justify interpersonal comparison of individuals’ income, they follow standard practice in 
assuming that inter-period income transfers are carried out in accordance with an intertemporal utility 
function that is common to all individuals. The common utility function is to be determined by the 
social planner based on his ethical value judgement, contains within it interpersonal comparability of 
both welfare levels and welfare differences, and can be viewed as a normative standard where 
individuals are treated symmetrically.7  
 
Specifically, the social planner is assumed to employ the conventional discounted utility model with 
perfect foresight, where preferences are intertemporal separable and additive. Let (C1,C2,..,CT) and 
(Y1,Y2,..,YT) be an individual’s stream of consumption levels and exogenous real disposable incomes 
net of interests for an individual. Under the assumption of a perfect credit market, the real interest 
rates on savings and borrowing are equal across the population, though they may vary over time. Let rt 
denote the real interest rates on income-transfers from period t-1 to t. From the viewpoint of the social 
planner, the individual’s preferred consumption profile (C1*, C2*,…, CT*) is defined as the solution of  
                                                     
7  The use of a common utility function is well-established in the public economic literature and has e.g. been proposed by 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Hammond (1991). It also forms the basis for the definition and measurement of a money-
metric measure of utility in for example King (1983) and Aaberge et al. (2004).   
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(2.1)  ( )
1
1
,..., 1
max (1 )
i iT
T
t
tC C t
U u C δ −
=
= +  
subject to the budget constraint8 
(2.2) ( ) ( )
1 11 1
1 1 .
T TT T
t j T t j T
t tj t j t
C r C Y r Y
= == + = +
+ + = + + ∏ ∏  
The preferred consumption level in period t, *tC , can be expressed as a function ft of δ, Y1,Y2,..,YT, and 
r2,r3,..,rT, 
(2.3) ( )* 1 2 2 3, , ,..., , , ,..., for all 1,2,...,t t T TC f Y Y Y r r r t Tδ= = . 
By inserting for (2.3) in (2.1) the maximum utility level (U) is given by 
(2.4) ( )* 1
1
(1 )
T
t
t
t
U u C δ −
=
≡ + . 
The permanent income measure is then defined as   
(2.5) ( )1 1 ,Z u U− −= Δ  
where { }1( ) inf : ( )u t x u x t− = ≥ is the left inverse of u and Δ is defined by  
(2.6) ( )( )1
1
1(1 ) 1 1
T
Tt
t
δδ δδ
−
−
=
+Δ = + = − + . 
Because the individual-specific Zs can be considered to be comparable money-metric measure of the 
well-being level associated with the income stream for a given individual, the distribution of the 
permanent incomes forms an appropriate basis for studying long-term inequality and social welfare. In 
particular, the social planner considers the income stream (Yi1,Yi2,..,YiT)  of individual i to be preferable 
to the income stream (Yj1,Yj2,..,YjT) of individual j if and only if Zi exceeds Zj.  
 
As shown in Aaberge and Mogstad (2009), Z encompasses standard measures of permanent income, 
depending on the assumptions made by the social planner about the intertemporal preferences of 
individuals and the functioning of the credit market. By assuming that the rates of time preferences 
                                                     
8 It is straightforward to extent the budget constraint to account for wealth, e.g. by assuming that the income in the first 
period Yi1 in (2.2) includes the initial stock of wealth.  
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and the real interest rates are equal to zero in each period, that is, 2 3 0Tr r r δ= = ⋅⋅ ⋅ = = = , we get that 
Z is equal to the average (real) income, 
=
T
1t
tY)T/1( . In Shorrocks (1978) as well as in most 
subsequent empirical studies of long-term inequality and income mobility according to the EOp 
principle, the average income is used as an approximation for permanent income. When 
2 3 Tr r r δ= = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = = , it follows directly that Z coincides with the annuity of the income stream, 
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
T T
T t T t
t t
t t
Y Yδ δ− −
= =
+ +   (when T is the basis for the annuity calculations). A benchmark case in 
intertemporal choice theory uses the annuity of the income stream as measure of permanent income 
(see e.g. Meghir, 2004). Further, Z coincides with the utility-equivalent annuity introduced by 
Nordhaus (1973) if  
(2.7)  ( )11 1 , 1( ) 1
log , 1.
x
u x
x
ε ε
ε
ε
−

− ≠
=
− =
 
That is, u is specified as a member of the Bergson family, which is a much used specification of the 
instantaneous utility function in intertemporal choice theory (Davies and Shorrocks, 2000).  
2.2. Imperfect credit marked 
In practice, the interest rates on borrowing and savings differ, which implies that (2.2) is no longer a 
valid representation of the budget constraints. In this case, the preferred consumption levels given by 
(2.3) will not form an appropriate basis for defining and measuring permanent income. Instead, we can 
apply the Kuhn-Tucker method to derive the conditional and preferred consumption profiles.  
 
Suppose that each individual is in each period faced with a single borrowing interest rate and a single 
savings interest rate (but different individuals may face different interest rates on borrowing and/or 
savings). If there are no liquidity constraints, the preferred consumption profile ( )1 2, ,..., TC C C∗ ∗ ∗  is 
defined as the solution of (2.1) subject to the budget constraints 
(2.8) ( )
( )
0
1
1
0
1 ,
1 0
t t t t t
T t T T T
S
S r S Y C
S r S Y C
γ
γ
−
−
=
= + + −
= + + − =
 
where St represents the assets at the end of period t earning an interest rate 1tr +γ , and  
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(2.9) 1
1
0
, 1 , 2,3,...,
0
t t
t t
t t
rs if S
r r t T
rb if S
γ γ−
−
≥
= − < < ∞ =
<
, 
where rst and rbt denote the saving and borrowing rates. Solving this maximization problem requires 
comparison of 3T-1 conditional consumption profiles for each individual. The consumption profiles are 
distinctive in terms of whether individual i in the various periods is considered to be a saver, a 
borrower, or locate at the kink and thereby consume all his assets. Each of these conditional 
consumption profiles is a candidate for the individual’s preferred consumption profile provided that 
the budget constraints are satisfied for the given values of Yt and trγ . The optimal consumption 
profile is determined as the utility maximising choice among the conditional consumption profiles 
satisfying their respective budget constraints. By inserting the consumption levels of the optimal 
consumption profiles into (2.4), the corresponding Z is obtained from (2.5).9  
3. Rank-dependent measures of inequality 
Empirical analyses of inequality in income distributions are conventionally based on the Lorenz curve 
and associated summary measures of inequality, which means that concern is directed towards income 
shares without taking account of differences in mean incomes. To summarize the information content 
of the Lorenz curve and to achieve rankings of intersecting Lorenz curves the standard approach is to 
employ the Gini coefficient in combination with one or two inequality measures from the Atkinson 
family or the Theil family. However, since the Gini coefficient and Atkinson’s and Theil’s measures 
of inequality have distinct theoretical foundations it is difficult to evaluate their capacity as 
complementary measures of inequality. An alternative approach, which will be chosen in this paper,  is 
to use measures of inequality which can be shown to have a common theoretical justification as 
criteria for ranking Lorenz curves.  
The Lorenz curve L for a cumulative income distribution F with mean μ is defined by 
(3.1) 1
0
1( ) ( ) , 0 1
u
L u F t dt u
μ
−
= ≤ ≤ ,  
                                                     
9 Presence of liquidity constraints will reduce the number of available conditional consumption profiles that have to be 
compared. For example, the case where borrowing in each period is prohibited corresponds to reducing the number of 
conditional consumption profiles to those satisfying 0tS ≥ . Thus, deriving Z subject to liquidity constraints is 
straightforward and can be considered as a special case of the method outlined above. 
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where { }1( ) inf : ( )F t x F x t− = ≥  is the left inverse of F. Thus, the Lorenz curve L(u) shows the share 
of total income received by the poorest 100 u per cent of the population. Note that F can either be a 
discrete or a continuous distribution function. Although the former is what we actually observe, the 
latter often allows simpler derivation of theoretical results and is a valid large sample approximation. 
Below F will be assumed to be a continuous distribution function. 
 
Under the restriction of equal mean incomes the problem of ranking Lorenz curves formally 
corresponds to the problem of choosing between uncertain prospects. This relationship has been 
utilized by e.g. Atkinson (1970) to characterize the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves in the 
case of distributions with equal mean incomes. This was motivated by the fact that in cases of equal 
mean incomes the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves is equivalent to second-degree stochastic 
dominance, which means that the criterion of non-intersecting Lorenz curves obeys the Pigou-Dalton 
principle of transfers. To perform inequality comparisons with Lorenz curves we can deal with 
distributions with equal means, or alternatively simply abandon the assumption of equal means and 
consider distributions of relative incomes.10 The latter approach normally forms the basis of empirical 
studies of income inequality and will be used in this paper. 
 
Let L denote the family of Lorenz curves, and let a social planner’s ranking of members of L  be 
represented by a preference ordering  , which will be assumed to satisfy the following basic axioms:  
 
Axiom 1 (Order).   is a transitive and complete ordering on L. 
Axiom 2 (Dominance). Let L , L1 2 ∈L .  If L (u) L (u)1 2≥  for all [ ]u 0,1∈  then L L .1 2  
Axiom 3 (Continuity). For each L ,∈L  the sets { }L : L L* *∈L   and { }L : L L* *∈L   are closed 
(w.r.t. L1-norm). 
 
Given the above continuity and dominance assumptions for the ordering   , Aaberge (2001) 
demonstrated that the following axiom, 
 
Axiom 4 (Independence). Let L1, L2 and L3 be members of L and let [ ]0,1 .α∈  Then 1 2L L  implies 
1 3 2 3(1 ) (1 )L L L Lα α α α+ − + − , 
                                                     
10 See e.g. Smith's (1979) discussion of necessities and Sen's (1992) discussion of relative deprivation. 
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characterizes the rank-dependent family of inequality measures pJ  defined by11  
(3.2) 
1 1
1
0 0
1( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )pJ L L v dp v p v F v dvμ
−
= + = −  , 
where p is a positive and non-increasing weight-function defined on the unit interval such that 
( ) 1vdp v = − . Note that p can be interpreted as a preference function of a social planner that assigns 
weights to the incomes of the individuals in accordance with their rank in the income distribution. 
Therefore, the functional form of p reveals the attitude towards inequality of a social planner who 
employs pJ  to judge between Lorenz curves.  
 
As was recognized by Ebert (1987) the justification of the social welfare function associated with pJ   
can be made in terms of value judgement of the trade-off between the mean and (in)equality in the 
distribution of income  
(3.3) 
1
1
0
(1 ) ( ) ( )p pW J p v F v dvμ −= − =  . 
Note that Wp can be interpreted as the equally distributed (equivalent) level of income. An alternative 
axiomatic justification for using the latter term of (3.3) as a criterion for ranking distribution functions 
F rather than as a trade-off between mean and equality was provided by Yaari (1987, 1988). Note that 
the normative justification for the family of rank-dependent measures of inequality pJ  is analogous to 
the justification for Atkinson’s expected utility type of inequality measures. The essential differences 
between these two approaches for measuring inequality and social welfare arise from the 
independence axioms. Whilst the expected utility independence axiom requires that the ordering of 
distributions of individual welfare is invariant with respect to identical mixing of the distributions 
being compared, the rank-dependent independence axiom requires that the ordering is invariant with 
respect to identical mixing of Lorenz curves (or identical mixing of the inverses of distributions) being 
compared. For further discussion, see Yaari (1988) and Aaberge (2001).  
 
                                                     
11 Mehran (1976) introduced an alternative version of (3.2) based on descriptive arguments. For alternative motivations of the 
JP-family and various subfamilies we refer to Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Weymark (1981), Yitzhaki (1983), Ben 
Porath and Gilboa (1994), and Aaberge (2000, 2007). 
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By specifying ( ) 2(1 )p v v= − we find that pJ  becomes equal to the Gini coefficient. To complement 
the information provided by the Gini coefficient it appears attractive to use members of the rank-
dependent family  , 1,2,...,
kk p
C J k= = where 
(3.4) ( )1
log , 1
( )
1 , 2,3,....
1
k k
v k
p v k v k
k
−
− =
= 
− =
−
 
As indicated by Aaberge (2000, 2007) the family { }: 1,2,...kC k =  uniquely determines the Lorenz 
curve L . Thus, by restricting to this family of inequality measures no information is lost. However, in 
applied work it is for practical reasons convenient to employ a few measures of inequality. To this 
end, Aaberge (2007) draws on standard statistical practice to justify the use of C1 (the Bonferroni 
coefficient), C2 (the Gini coefficient) and C3 as a basis for summarizing the inequality information in 
an income distribution and the associated social welfare functions W1, W2 and W3 to assess the trade-
off between efficiency and (in)equality. Moreover, these three measures of inequality also prove to 
supplement each other with regard to sensitivity to transfers at the lower, the central and the upper part 
of the income distribution.  
4.  An analytical framework for measuring inequality of 
opportunity  
This section introduces the generalized family of rank-dependent measures of ex post as well as ex 
ante opportunity inequality and social welfare. The proposed framework are valid for measuring short-
term as well as long-term EOp, depending on whether we let snapshots of income or permanent 
income form the basis.   
 
We have a continuum of individuals. Each individual is completely described by a list of traits, which 
can be partitioned into two different classes: traits or factors beyond the individual control, represented 
by a person's vector of circumstances c  belonging to an abstract and finite set { }1Ω , , nc c=  ; and 
factors for which the individual is fully responsible, represented by a scalar variable12 e  (effort), 
e +∈Θ ⊆ ℜ . We assume that the circumstances of an individual are constant over time: this implies 
that the type partition is constant over time.13  
                                                     
12 In the analysis it could equally well be represented as a vector.  
13 The same assumption is made by Bourguignon et al. (2007). 
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Income is generated by a function :g +Ω×Θ → ℜ :  
(4.1) ( ),g c e=   
Hence g  is a “production function” that relates an individual's future income to her effort and her 
circumstances. We do not know the form of the function g ; we know, however, that it is increasing in 
e and the same for all individuals. A society income distribution is represented by a cumulative 
distribution function [ ]: 0,1F +ℜ → .  
 
We can partition any given population into n  subpopulations, each representing a class identified by 
the variable c . For ic ∈Ω , we call “type” i  the set of individuals whose set of circumstances is ci. 
Within type i  there will be a cumulative distribution of income iF  and a population share denoted by 
iq  so that 
1
( ) ( )
m
i i
i
F x q F x
=
= . A second partition is based on the responsibility e : For all degrees of 
responsibility Θ∈e  we call tranche e  the set of individuals whose responsibility level is equal to e . 
We can observe c  but not  e . Given ( ) , 1,...,iF x i n= , , with [ ]1 : 0,1iF − +→ ℜ  we denote 
{ }1( ) inf : ( )i iF s x F x s− = ≥ , which represents the income of the person whose rank in the distribution 
iF  is s, the left continuous inverse distribution of iF . 
 
Roemer (1993, 1998) suggests to take, as an inter-type comparable measure of effort, the quantile of 
the effort distribution in the type at which an individual sits; this, given the monotonicity of the 
income function, will correspond to the quantile in the income distribution of the type. We adopt this 
solution and hence we say that all individuals at the s quantile of their respective type income 
distributions have the same effort. Thus, considering types 1, ,n , we define the tranche s as the 
subset of individuals whose incomes are at the ths  quantile of their respective type income 
distributions. 
4.1. Ex post approach 
Let 1 1 11 2( ) ( ) ... ( )mF s F s F s
− − −≤ ≤ ≤    be the ordering of incomes 1 1 11 2( ), ( ),..., ( )mF s F s F s− − −  across types at 
trance (quantile) s. Since the type-specific income distributions might intersect note that the type 
ordering by income might change across quantiles; i.e. 1( )kF s
−  and 1( )kF v−  might represent different 
types. Accordingly, the proportion of people associated with the lowest income, the second lowest 
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income, etc might change across quantiles.  Thus, let ( )iq s  be the population share associated with the 
individual having rank i at trance s.  Moreover, let 
1
( ) ( )
j
j i
i
a s q s
=
=  and ( ) 1 ( )j jb s a s= − . 
 
The quantile-specific mean and Lorenz curve are defined by  
(4.2) 1 1
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m m
i i i i
i i
s q s F s q F sμ − −
= =
= =   
and 
(4.3) 
1
1
( ) ( )
( ( ); ) , 1,2,..., , 0 1.
( )
j
i i
i
j
q s F s
L a s s j m s
sμ
−
=
= = ≤ ≤
 
 
Inserting  (4.2) and (4.3) in (3.2) yields the following family of quantile-specific rank-dependent 
measures of inequality of opportunity  
(4.4) ( ) 1
1
1( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
m
p j j j
j
J s q s p a s F s
h s sμ
−
=
= −   ,  
where ( )
1
( ) ( ) ( )
m
j j
j
h s q s p a s
=
= , (1) 1p =  and ( )
1
1 1
1
m
j
j
p a
m
=
=
−
 .   
 
Thus, ( )pJ s  measures income inequality due to different circumstances for those who belong to 
tranche s and thus have exerted the same degree of effort. According to the Compensation Principle,  
( )pJ s  can be interpreted as the inequality of opportunity in tranche s. In order to define an overall 
measure of inequality of opportunity a method for aggregating the tranche-specific inequality 
measures is required. To this end, we rely on the Principle of Utilitarian Reward introduced by 
Fleurbaey (2008), which states the social irrelevance of inequalities due to differences in effort. This 
amounts to say that any “equalizing transfer” between tranches should not change income inequality 
or social welfare, whatever the effort level of the persons involved in it. That is, an equal weight 
should be assigned to each tranche-specific inequality measure, whatever degree of effort has been 
exerted. Accordingly, the average of the tranche-specific inequality of opportunity measures  
(4.5) 
1
0
( )p pJ J s ds=   
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defines a family of rank-dependent measures of overall inequality of opportunity. Thus, inequality of 
opportunity decreases if outcome inequality decreases among the individuals with the same degree of 
effort. 
 
The associated social welfare function is given by 
(4.6) (1 )p pW Jμ= −  
where 
1
1
0
( )i iF t dtμ −=   and 1
10
( )
m
i i
i
s ds qμ μ μ
=
= = . 
 
Note that ep  defined by  
(4.7) ( ) 1, 1( ) 0, 1,2,...,e j
j
p a s
j m
=
= 
=  
represents the upper limit of inequality aversion exhibited by the family of non-increasing weight 
functions p. By inserting (4.7) in (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6) we get 
(4.8) 
11
11
min ( )( )( ) 1 1
( ) ( )
ii m
e
F sF sJ s
s sμ μ
−
−
≤ ≤
= − = −

, 
(4.9) 
11
1
0
min ( )
1
( )
ii m
e
F s
J ds
sμ
−
≤ ≤
= −   
and 
(4.10) 
11
1
0
min ( )
( )
ii m
e
F s
W ds
s
μ
μ
−
≤ ≤
=  .  
In the Gini case we get, since 
1 1
( ) ( )
m m
j j j j
j j
q s a s q a
= =
=   and 1j jb a= − , that 
(4.11) 
1
1
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1
( )
m
j j i
j
m
j j
j
q s b s F s
G s
s q bμ
−
=
=
= −



, 
and 
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(4.12) 
1 1
1
10
0
1
( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) 1
m
i
j j
j
m
j j
j
F sq s b s ds
s
G G s ds
q b
μ
−
=
=
   
= = −

 

  
4.2. Ex ante approach 
The ex ante approach puts special emphasis on the differences in the outcome prospects for classes of 
individuals with identical circumstances. Accordingly, it focuses on inequality between types, and is 
instead neutral with respect to inequality within types. Hence, the ex ante approach is more focused on 
inequalities between social groups. Referring to the Principle of Utilitarian Reward introduced by 
Fleurbaey (2008), which states the social irrelevance of inequalities due to differences in effort, this 
implies that any equalizing transfer with identical circumstances should not change income inequality 
or social welfare, whatever the effort level of the persons involved in it. This means that an ex ante 
approach for measuring inequality of opportunity will solely depend on the type-specific mean 
incomes. 
 
Assume that 1 2 m...μ μ μ≤ ≤ ≤  and that iq  is associated with iμ . Moreover we assume that every 
individual of a sub-population receives the same income equal to the sub-group mean. Thus, in this 
case the group-specific distributions are defined by  
(4.13) 
0,
( )
1,
i
i
i
x
F x
x
μ
μ
∗
<
=  ≥
  
and the associated Lorenz curve14 by  
(4.14) 1
1
( ) , 1,2,..., .
j
i i
i
j m
i i
i
q
L a j m
q
μ
μ
∗ =
=
= =


  
Moreover, the associated rank-dependent family of inequality measures is defined by  
                                                     
14 The opportunity partial ordering based on the Lorenz curve below was characterized in Peragine (2002).  
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(4.15) 1
1
( )
1
( )
m
j j j
j
p m
j j
j
q p a
J
q p a
μ
μ
=∗
=
= −


 . 
The pJ
∗  measure captures the inequality between types: this inequality, according to the Compensation 
Principle, can be interpreted as ex ante inequality of opportunity. The welfare function associated with 
pJ
∗  is defined by  
(4.16) 1
1
( )
(1 )
( )
m
j j j
j
p p m
j j
j
q p a
W J
q p a
μ
μ =∗ ∗
=
= − =


 
By inserting (4.7) in (4.16) and (4.17) we get 
(4.17) 1
min
1
ii m
eJ
μ
μ
∗ ≤ ≤
= −  
and 
(4.18) 
1
mine ii mW μ
∗
≤ ≤
= . 
Note that eW
∗  corresponds to the EOp welfare function introduced by Roemer (1993, 1998) when 
considering snapshots of income. When  iμ  represents the mean permanent income (defined by (2.5)) 
of type i, then eW
∗  coincides with the EOp welfare function introduced by Bourguignon et al. (2007) if 
and only if iμ  can be expressed as weighted average of the period-specific type means. 
 
When p represents the Gini weight function then pJ
∗  is given by  
(4.19) 1
1
1
m
j j j
j
m
j j
j
q b
G
q b
μ
μ
=∗
=
= −


. 
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5. Empirical results 
This section implements the proposed methods to measure inequality of opportunity and social 
welfare, using panel data from Norway on individual income over the working lifespan. This allows us 
to examine how well analysis of inequality of opportunity and social welfare based on snapshots of 
income approximate the results based on long-term income. Further, we investigate how sensitive 
analyses based on EOp and EO (equality of outcome) is to the choice of accounting period of income. 
For brevity, we will throughout the empirical analysis only employ the Gini coefficient.  
 
Data. Our empirical analysis utilizes several register databases provided by Statistics Norway. The 
data include a rich longitudinal dataset containing records for every Norwegian from 1967 to 2006. 
The variables captured in this dataset include individual demographic information (sex, year and 
municipality of birth, number of siblings) and socio-economic data (income and education). 
Importantly, the dataset includes personal identifiers, allowing us to link children to their parents. Our 
income measure is defined in close agreements with international recommendations (see Expert Group 
on Household Income Statistics, 2001), and incorporates annual wages, capital income, and all public 
cash transfers. We use the consumer price index to make earnings and incomes from different periods 
comparable. Throughout this paper we focus on individual income, because our family data does not 
allow us to link spouses living in cohabitation. Nor can we identify married spouses before the mid 
1970s. Therefore, we cannot construct a measure of family or household income.  
 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the 1942-1944 cohorts in order to ensure availability of data on 
income for more or less the entire working lifespan. In particular, these cohorts are between 23 and 25 
years old in 1967 and between 62 and 64 in 2006.15 Our analytical sample is restricted to males, given 
their role of breadwinner and primary wage-earner for these cohorts. Also, we exclude individuals 
whose information on annual income is missing. Finally, we drop observations where information on 
parents is missing. The final sample used in the analysis consists of 26 090 individuals.  
 
Circumstances and types. How to define the exact set of individual circumstances is a controversial 
question. Besides, in empirical work, observing the entire set of circumstances is clearly out of reach. 
In this paper, we focus on the dependence of individual opportunity on a restricted set of 
circumstances relating to family background. The role of families in determining socio-economic 
outcomes has been extensively discussed in economics as well as from other scientific perspectives. 
                                                     
15 Note that people are eligible for early retirement when they have become 62 years old. 
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Parents influence their children via several channels: investment in their children’s education, 
transmission of cultural values and social skills, and genetic endowments. As argued by Roemer 
(1998) and others, equality of opportunity requires compensating the influence of family background 
on individual outcomes, as it lies beyond individual responsibility and choice.   
 
A large body of empirical research shows a strong degree of intergenerational transmission, as 
parental characteristics like education and income are highly correlated with the outcomes of children 
along the same dimensions (see e.g. Solon 1999). As a starting point, we therefore split the sample by 
birth cohort and further divide it into three groups based on the highest educational attainment of the 
parents: compulsory school (grades 1-7), middle school (grades 8-10), and higher education (11 or 
more years of education). Unfortunately, we do not have information on income of the parents during 
individuals’ childhood. Next, we partition the sample according to an indicator for urbanity, equal to 
one if the individual was born in one of the five bigger cities of Norway (Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, 
Stavanger, Drammen). The idea is that urbanity may proxy for neighbourhood effects, which may 
arise from varying local resource bases, such as availability of institutions like schools and childcare, 
as well as through social interaction in peer-groups, like attitudes and preference formation as well as 
the existence and enforcement of social norms.16 Finally, we partition the sample according to an 
indicator for being raised in a large family, equal to one if the individual has two or more siblings. 
Drawing on the quantity-quality model of Becker and Lewis (1973), a large body of empirical research 
has shown a fairly strong association between number of siblings and children’s outcome. In 
particular, it appears to be a non-monotonic relationship between family size and children’s outcomes, 
with substantial negative effects of large sibship size (see Mogstad and Wiswall, 2009). Thus, to 
measure EOp, the sample is divided into 36 mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive types 
based on circumstances. 
 
Descriptive statistics. Table 1 displays the composition of the sample according to the variables used 
to defined circumstances. We see that about 20 percent of the sample was born in urban areas, and 
about 45 percent come from a large family. Moreover, it is evident that about 53 percent has parents 
with only compulsory schooling, almost 30 percent has at least one parent who attended middle 
school, and less than 18 percent has at least one parent with higher education. It is further evident that 
the composition is fairly similar across cohorts.  
 
                                                     
16 Raaum et al. (2006) show significant effects of childhood neighbourhood on children’s long-run outcomes.   
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Table 1 also shows that the income of these cohorts increase over time. In particular, the period-
specific incomes are, on average, lower than the mean income over the period 1967-2006 up until the 
early 1990s. It is also clear that the long-term mean income exceeds the permanent income measure, as 
only the latter takes into the costs of inter-period income transfers. As expected, the incomes of the 
older cohort are relatively high during the first years as they have more labor market experience, but 
are surpassed by the younger cohorts when they grow older. The mean and the permanent income are 
rather similar across cohorts. Figure 1 graphs the cumulative distribution of permanent income for the 
sample as a whole, and for different types according to parental education. As expected, permanent 
income is increasing in parent’s education.   
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Birth cohort 
 42 43 44 42-44 
Period-specific income     
1967-1968 157,338 150,824 141,850 149,191 
1975-1976 240,324 239,477 233,859 237,538 
1985-1986 244,191 244,085 239,967 242,518 
1995-1996 277,150 283,057 279,302 279,926 
2005-2006 311,261 329,562 328,496 323,958 
Mean income (1967-2006) 251,824 258,005 249,505 252,955 
Permanent income (1967-2006) 234,976 237,163 230,058 233,787 
Circumstances (populaton shares)     
Urban 18.18 20.09 21.06 19.92 
Large family 46.02 44.51 43.69 44.62 
Parental Education     
Comp. school only 53.48 52.59 51.39 52.38 
Middle school 29.00 29.39 30.67 29.77 
Higher education 17.52 18.02 17.95 17.85 
Sample size 7,399 8,572 10,119 26,090 
Notes: Period-specific income is defined as the average income over the two-year period. Permanent 
income is defined by (2.1), (2.7), (2.8) and (2..9) with ε = 2 and δ = .02, and annual real interest rates 
on borrowing and savings given by Norwegian official statistics. 
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Figure 1.  Marginal distribution of permanent income for entire sample and by parental 
education 
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Notes: Permanent income is defined by (2.1), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9)  with ε = 2 and δ = .02, and annual 
real interest rates on borrowing and savings given by Norwegian official statistics. The distribution 
denoted entire sample includes the incomes of all individuals. The distributions denoted Higher 
education, Middle school and Compulsory school are graphed separately by parental education for the 
sub-sample of individuals from the 1944 cohort who were born in an urban area and living in a small 
family. 
 
Equality of outcome. 
Figure 2 graphs the time-trend in inequality according to the EO principle based on period-specific 
(two years) income (cf. Period-specific, EO), and compare it to the EO measure of inequality based on 
permanent income (cf. Permanent, EO.) We see that inequality is fairly stable during the 1970s when 
the individuals are their mid 30s, with a Gini-coefficient ranging from .18 to .20. After this point in 
time, inequality is increasing steadily, almost doubling as the individuals reach the peak of the age-
earnings profile.17 In contrast, the Gini coefficient in permanent income is as low as .17, which 
suggests substantial income mobility. Moreover, our results indicate that snapshots of inequality based 
on income early in the working lifespan may provide a reasonable approximation of inequality in 
permanent income when the EO principle is employed.  
 
                                                     
17 A possible explanation is that the age-earnings profile differs systematically across individuals, with relatively high 
earnings growth among individuals with high education. Another explanation is that skill-biased technical change has led to 
increased earnings inequality. Investigating these two explanations is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Figure 3 reports the time-trend in social welfare according to the EO principle based on period-
specific income (cf. Period-specific, EO), and compares it to EO measure of inequality in permanent 
income (cf. Permanent, EO). We see social welfare is increasing substantially during the 1970s, as 
mean incomes rise and inequality is stable. Over the next decade, social welfare declines as the 
welfare loss from increased inequality dominates the increase in mean incomes. During the economic 
boom in the 1990s, social welfare increased once again owing to a large increase in mean incomes, 
despite substantially higher income inequality. We also see that social welfare in permanent income 
mirrors social welfare in period-specific inequality fairly well when the individuals are between 30 
and 50 years of age, in contrast to the inequality results.  
 
Figure 2.  Gini-inequality according to EO and ex-post EOp based on period-specific income 
and permanent income 
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Notes: Permanent income is defined by (2.1), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9)  with ε = 2 and δ = .02, and annual 
real interest rates on borrowing and savings given by Norwegian official statistics. The ex-post Gini 
EOp measure of inequality is defined by (4.12). 
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Figure 3.  Social welfare according to EO and ex-post EOp based on period-specific income and 
permanent income 
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Notes: Permanent income is defined by (2.1), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) with ε = 2 and δ = .02, and annual 
real interest rates on borrowing and savings given by Norwegian official statistics. The ex-post EOp 
social welfare measure is defined by (4.6).  
 
Ex-post equality of opportunity. 
In order to estimate the Gini EOp coefficient defined by (4.12) and the associated social welfare 
function defined by (4.6) we first have to estimate the quantile-specific EOp Gini coefficient for an 
appropriate selection of quantiles. This study relies on estimates for all percentiles, which means that 
the overall EOp Gini is based on 100 quantile-specific EOp Gini estimates (see Figure 4 for permanent 
income).  
 
Turning attention to our ex-post measures of EOp, Figure 2 shows the trend in inequality based on 
period-specific income (cf. Period-specific, ex-post EOp) and compares it to the EO measure of 
inequality in permanent income (cf. Permanent, ex-post EOp). We see immediately that the ex-post 
EOp measures of inequality are less than one third of the corresponding EO measures, suggesting that 
a large fraction of inequality of outcomes is attributable to effort. This is true both when permanent 
income and period-specific incomes form the basis for the analysis. Indeed, opportunities in long-term 
income appear to be very equally distributed. Figure 2 also reveals that the inequality time-trends in 
ex-post EOp is quite similar to that of EO. In addition, our results indicate that snapshots of inequality 
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based on income early in the working lifespan may provide a reasonable approximation of inequality 
in permanent income, also when the EOp principle is employed.  
 
Figure 4 breaks down the ex-post EOp measure of inequality into the different percentile-specific EOp 
measures. We see that inequality is remarkably stable across the percentiles. In particular, the 
percentile-specific Gini coefficients vary between .04 and .06 for quantiles located between the 3 and 
85 percentile, and somewhat higher at the tails of the distribution.  
 
Figure 4.  Percentile-specific Gini-inequality according to ex-post EOp based on permanent 
income 
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Notes: Permanent income is defined by (2.1), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9)  with ε = 2 and δ = .02, and annual 
real interest rates on borrowing and savings given by Norwegian official statistics. The percentile-
specific ex-post EOp measure is given by (4.4).  
 
Figure 3 reports social welfare measures according to the ex-post EOp principle based on period-
specific income (cf. Period-specific, EOp) and permanent income (cf. Permanent, EOp). Compared to 
the EO results, social welfare is considerably higher when the ex-post EOp principle forms the basis 
for the analysis, owing to lower inequality. Specifically, the ex-post EOp measure of social welfare in 
permanent income is almost 15 percent higher than the EO measure. Yet the time trend in social 
welfare based on period-specific incomes is quite similar across the two measures.  In particular, we 
see that the ex-post EOp measure of social welfare based on snapshots of income during the period the 
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individuals are between 30 and 50 years of age are fairly similar to the corresponding measures based 
on permanent income. 
 
Ex-ante equality of opportunity.  
Figure 5 shows a strong similarity between ex-ante and ex-post EOp measures of inequality. This 
holds both for permanent income and the time-trend in period-specific income, except for the upper 
part. Figure 6 graphs the difference in social welfare according to the ex-ante and ex-post EOp 
measures. The results mirror the similarity in inequality across the two types of EOp measures.  
 
Figure 5.  Gini-inequality according to ex-ante and ex-post EOp based on period-specific income 
and permanent income 
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Notes: Permanent income is defined by (2.1), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9)  with ε = 2 and δ = .02, and annual 
real interest rates on borrowing and savings given by Norwegian official statistics. The Gini ex-post 
and ex ante EOp measures of inequality are defined by (4.12) and (4.19). 
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Figure 6.  Difference in social welfare according to ex-ante and ex-post EOp based on period-
specific income and permanent income 
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Notes: Permanent income is defined by (2.1), (2.8) qnd (2.9) with ε = 2 and δ = .02, and annual real 
interest rates on borrowing and savings given by Norwegian official statistics. The ex-post and ex ante 
EOp social welfare measures are defined by (4.6) and (4.16). 
6. Summary and conclusion 
More than half a century ago, Friedman (1957, p38) argued that “the identification of low measured 
income with 'poor' and high measured income with 'rich' is justified only if measured income can be 
regarded as an estimate of expected income over a lifetime or a large fraction thereof". His concern 
was that studies based on fluctuating annual incomes may provide a misleading picture of the 
consumption possibilities of individuals, and consequently, also the extent of inequality and social 
welfare in a society. Instead, methods used for distributional analysis should reflect that income can 
be, and regularly is, used for consumption not only within the year that it is obtained, but also in other 
years.18  
 
In this paper, we introduce and apply a general framework for evaluating long-term income 
distributions according to the EOp principle. Specifically, we employ an axiomatic approach to justify 
                                                     
18 In this regard, it is of interest that most individuals in the OECD-countries actually carry out intertemporal income transfers 
to smooth consumption, largely by means of education loans, housing mortgage and pension schemes.See Borsch-Supan 
(2003) for a cross-country study of life-cycle savings. 
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the introduction of a generalized family of rank-dependent of opportunity inequality and social 
welfare. Our framework allows for both an ex-ante and an ex-post approach to EOp. Our ex-post 
approach relies on a permanent income measure defined as the minimum annual expenditure an 
individual would need in order to be as well off as he could be by undertaking inter-period income 
transfers. There is long-term ex-post inequality of opportunity if individuals who exert the same effort 
have different permanent incomes. In comparison, the ex-ante approach focuses on the expected 
permanent income for individuals with identical circumstances. Hence, the ex-ante approach pays 
attention to inequalities in expected permanent income between different types of individuals.   
 
To demonstrate the empirical relevance of a long-run perspective on EOp, we have used a unique 
panel data from Norway on individuals’ incomes over their working lifespan. The insights from our 
empirical results may be summarized with three conclusions. First, EOp measures of inequality are 
less than one third of the corresponding EO measures, suggesting that a large fraction of inequality of 
outcomes is attributable to effort. This is true both when permanent income and snapshots of income 
form the basis for the analysis. Hence, social welfare is much higher according to the EOp principle 
than the EO principle. Second, snapshots of income overstate inequality compared to analysis based 
on permanent income, suggesting substantial income mobility. However, our results indicate that 
snapshots of inequality based on income early in the working lifespan may provide a reasonable 
approximation of inequality in permanent income; in comparison, social welfare measures based on 
snapshots of income during the period the individuals are between 30 and 50 are fairly similar to the 
corresponding measures based on permanent income. This is true both when the EO and the EOp 
principle form the basis for the analysis. Third, we find some similarity between ex-ante and ex-post 
EOp measures of inequality and social welfare. This holds both for permanent income and the time-
trend in period-specific income, except for the latest 15 years of the participation of the labour market.   
 
29 
References 
Aaberge, R. (2000): Characterizations of Lorenz Curves and Income Distributions, Social Choice and 
Welfare 17, 639-653. 
Aaberge, R. (2001): Axiomatic Characterization of the Gini Coefficient and Lorenz Curve Orderings, 
Journal of Economic Theory 101, 115-132. 
Aaberge, R. (2007): Gini’s Nuclear Family, Journal of Economic Inequality 5, 305-322, 2007. 
Aaberge, R., Colombino, U. and S. Strøm (2004): Do More Equal Slices Shrink the Cake? An 
Empirical Investigation of Tax-Transfer Reform Proposals in Italy, Journal of Population Economics, 
17, 767-785. 
Aaberge, R. and M. Mogstad (2009): “On the Measurement of Long-term Income Inequality and 
Income Mobility”, Working Paper No. 09/2009, ICER, Torino, 2009. 
Aaberge, R and U. Colombino (2009): “Accounting for Family Background when Designing Optimal 
Income Taxes: A Microeconometric Simulation Approach”, Discussion Paper No. 4598, IZA, Bonn 
Ben Porath, E. and I. Gilboa (1994): Linear Measures, the Gini Index, and the Income-Equality Trade-
off,  Journal of Economic Theory 64, 443-467. 
Becker, G. and H. Lewis (1973): “On the Interaction between the Quantity and 
Quality of Children,” Journal of Political Economy, 81, 279–288. 
Bourguignon, F., F. Ferreira, and M. Menéndez (2003): Inequality of Outcomes and Inequality of 
Opportunities in Brazil, World Bank Policy Research Papers 3174. 
Bourguignon, F., F. Ferreira, and M. Wolton (2007): Equity, efficiency and inequality traps: a research 
agenda. Jornal of Economic Inequality Vol. 5, n.2. 
Borsch-Supan, A. (2003): Life-cycle Savings and Public Policy: A Cross-National Study of 
Six Countries, Academic Press, San Diego.  
Chakravarty, S. J., B. Dutta and J. A. Weymark (1985): “Ethical  Indices of Income Mobility”, Social 
Choice and Welfare, 2, 1-21. 
Checchi, D. and V. Peragine (2009): Regional Disparities and Inequality of Opportunity: The Case of 
Italy, Jornal of Economic Inequality, DOI 10.1007/s10888-009-9118-3. 
Dardanoni V., Fields G., Roemer J. E. and Sanchez-Puerta M. L. (2006): How demanding should 
equality of opportunity be and how much we have achieved?, in Morgan S. L., Grusky D. B. and 
Fields G. Mobility and Inequality , Stanford University Press; 
Davies, J. and A. Shorrocks (2000): “The Distribution of Wealth” in A. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon 
(eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 1, Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
Deaton, A. And J. Muellbauer (1980): Economics and Consumer Behavior, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Donaldson, D. and J.A. Weymark (1980): A Single Parameter Generalization of the Gini Indices of 
Inequality, Journal of Economic Theory 22, 67-86. 
Donaldson, D. and J.A. Weymark (1983): Ethically flexible Indices for Income Distributions in the 
Continuum, Journal of Economic Theory 29, 353-358. 
Ebert, U. (1987): “Size and Distribution of Incomes as Determinants of Social Welfare”, Journal of 
Economic Theory, 41, 23-33. 
30 
Expert Group on Household Income Statistics (2001): Final Report and Recommendations, Ottawa, 
Canada. 
Ferreira F. H. G., Gignoux J. (2008): The measurement of inequality of opportunity: Theory and an 
application to Latin America, the World Bank Policy Research WP n.4659; 
Fleurbaey M (2008): Fairness, responsibility and welfare, Oxford University Press; 
Friedman, M. (1957): A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton University Press, Princeton.  
Friedman, M. (1962): Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago, Chicago University Press. 
Hammond, P. (1991): “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should be 
Made” in J. Elster and J. Roemer (eds.) Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-being, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.  
Lefranc A., Pistolesi N. Trannoy A. (2006): Inequality of opportunity vs inequality of outcomes: are 
western societies all alike?, Review of Income and Wealth, vol. 54; 
Fleurbaey M. and Peragine V. (2009): Ex ante versus ex post equality of opportunity, ECINEQ 
working paper 2009. 
King, M. (1983): Welfare Analysis of Tax Reforms Using Household Data, Journal of Public 
Economics, 21, 183-214. 
Maasoumi, E. and M. Trede (2001): "Comparing Income Mobility In Germany And The United States 
Using Generalized Entropy Mobility Measures", Review of Economics and Statistics, 83, 551-559. 
Meghir, C. (2004); "A Retrospective on Friedman's Theory of Permanent Income," Economic Journal, 
114, 293-306. 
Mehran, F. (1976): Linear Measures of Inequality, Econometrica 44, 805-809. 
Mogstad, M. and M. Wiswall (2009): “How Linear Models Can Mask Non-Linear Causal 
Relationships: An Application to Family Size and Children’s Outcomes”, Discussion Paper, 586, 
Statistics Norway. 
Nordhaus, W. (1973): “The Effects of Inflation on the Distribution of Economic Welfare”, Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, 5, 465-508.  
Peragine, V. (2002): Opportunity egalitarianism and income inequality: the rank-dependent approach, 
Mathematical Social Sciences 44, 45–64. 
Peragine, V. (2004): Measuring and implementing equality of opportunity for income, Social Choice 
and Welfare 22, 1–24. 
Peragine V and L. Serlenga (2008): Higher education and equality of opportunity in Italy, in J. Bishop 
and B. Zheng (eds.) Research in Economic Inequality, vol XIV; 
Roemer, J (1993): A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 10, 146-166. 
Roemer, J (1998): Equality of Opportunity, Harvard University Press. 
Roemer, J. E., Aaberge, R., Colombino, U., Fritzell, J., Jenkins, S. P., Lefranc, A., Marx, I., Page, M., 
Pommer, E. and J. Ruiz-Castillo (2003): To what Extent Do Fiscal Regimes Equalize Opportunities 
for Income Acquisition among Citizens?, Journal of Public Economics 87, 539-565, 2003. 
Raaum, O., K. Salvanes, and E. Sørensen (2006): "The Neighbourhood is Not What it Used to be," 
Economic Journal, 116, 200-222. 
Sen, A. (1992): “Inequality Reexamined”, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
31 
Smith, A. (1979): “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
Shorrocks, A. (1978): “Income Inequality and Income Mobility”, Journal of Economic Theory, 19, 
376-393.  
Solon, Gary, (1999): "Intergenerational mobility in the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics, 
in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, p. 
1761-1800, Elsevier. 
Weymark, J. (1981): Generalised Gini Inequality Indices, Mathematical Social Sciences 1, 409-430. 
Yaari, M.E. (1988): A controversial Proposal Concerning Inequality Measurement, Journal of 
Economic Theory 44, 381-397. 
 
